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I.

INTRODUCTION

Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, Alphabet, and Facebook. These household names are the five
largest public companies by market capitalization. 1 They control many facets of everyday life and
are essential to many forms of commerce. The reach of these platforms has also greatly expanded
to many more businesses, consumers, and governments.

Increased antitrust scrutiny has

accompanied the rapid growth of these companies.2 Tech platforms are the gatekeepers of
commerce and provide the essential distribution channels for many firms. 3 Platforms function by
bringing together many different market participants. The name Amazon comes to mind when a
person considers shopping online. Many sellers rely on Amazon to reach consumers and are bound
by whatever terms and fees Amazon sets. Amazon contracts with logistical compaines to facilitate
transportation. Congressional findings have determined that large technology platforms dominate
the market and use their market position to crush rivals. 4
While the debate over the role of antitrust in dealing with the emergence of ever-larger
technology platforms continues, the long-standing debate over antitrust standing gains even more
importance. The fundamental question remains over which party should have standing to sue a
technology platform. At the essence of any legal claim is the requirement for standing. Pass-on
theory can function as a defensive or offensive mechanism that courts utilize to determine which
parties have standing. Courts weigh redressability with concerns related to judicial efficiency in
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determining whether pass on theory applies. On the one hand, allowing pass-on damages allows
for any injured party to have standing. This is especially useful when dealing with platforms
because they are the distribution channels for a vast array of entities. On the other hand, greater
standing comes at the expense of judicial efficiency and involves complicated economic
forecasting.
This comment seeks to further the conversation of antitrust standing in the growing world
of technology platforms. Part II analyzes Hanover Shoe5 , a case showing the origins of pass-on
theory as a defensive mechanism. Part III examines the Illinois Brick6 Court’s rejection of the use
of pass-on theory as an offensive mechanism, how the decision is inconsistent with Hanover Shoe,
and evaluates the economic merits of limiting pass-on. Part IV discusses the Court’s current
approach to antitrust standing and responds to criticism that the decision is not consistent with
precedent. Part V evaluates the drawbacks of the current approach when applied to platforms and
proposes an alternative consistent with the goals of antitrust.

II.

HANOVER SHOE: THE PASS-ON DEFENSE

Hanover Shoe marks the early origins of pass-on theory. The case results from a civil
action by Hanover Shoe, Inc. (Hanover) against United Shoe Machinery Corp. (United).7
Hanover is a shoe manufacturer and customer of United. 8

Hanover alleges that United

monopolized the shoe machinery industry in violation of the Sherman Act. 9 The District Court
found that United’s monopolistic leasing practices increased Hanover’s costs.10 United asserted
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that even if it was found to be a monopolist, Hanover suffered no legally cognizable injury because
Hanover charged the excess cost to consumers. 11
The Court declined to accept this pass-on defense as an exception to antitrust principles
providing relief to any injured party.12 The alleged monopolist, United, created the defense as a
potential way to avoid liability. In reality, this new defense had no basis from antitrust precedent.
The Court stated that “as long as the seller continues to charge the illegal price, he takes from the
buyer more than the law allows.”13 The Court also cited to the principle that the victim of an
overcharge is damaged by the overcharge amount. 14 Specifically, the Clayton Act provides
standing in relation to any damages sustained.15 The buyer suffered damages as the price he paid
is illegally high and suffered lost profits as a result of the overcharge.16 Even if Hanover was able
to increase the price it charges by the amount of the overcharge, it lost the opportunity to make a
greater profit because United charged it more.
The Court was concerned with the impacts on antitrust law should the pass-on defense be
allowed. Specifically, the Court did not want to add additional burdens to discourage antitrust
suits. The calculation of the impact of a single change such as price involves complex econometric
models.17 Even if the seller shows that the buyer raised his price by the overcharge, there will still
need to be a showing that the buyer would not have raised the price otherwise. 18 The Court assumed
that if the pass-on defense is accepted, then defendants in antitrust suits will frequently seek to
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utilize this defense.19 Therefore, antitrust proceedings will become considerably more complicated
and lengthy.20
The Court raised concern that this added complexity of damage calculations would
discourage antitrust actions. If the pass-on defense is accepted, buyers would also have to show
that they did not simply pass on the excess cost. This added complexity of tracing the effects of
the overcharge on prices could deter potential plaintiffs. The monopolists would have a greater
chance of retaining the fruits of their illegality because the ultimate consumers would have a
smaller stake in litigation and be less likely to initiate a class action.21 In this case, it would mean
that individual buyers of shoes would have to establish the complex calculations necessitated by
the pass-on defense.
The practical consequences of allowing the pass-on defense are significant. Consider if
Uber decides to raise the fees that it charges to restaurants that use its delivery service by ten
percent. If the pass-on defense is allowed, then Uber can avoid liability by stating that restaurants
raised their prices by ten percent so there was no injury for the restaurants needed for standing.
Now restaurants would have to engage in complex calculations trace the effects of the overcharge
on them and their consumers. If Uber could show that the restaurants raised their prices by the
amount Uber charged extra, then restaurants would be without legal recourse. This defense does
not account for the possibility that restaurants raising their prices would cause consumers to buy
less or that restaurants would profit more if they raised prices without Uber’s extra fees. The
Hanover Shoe court was in line with precedent to stop such an unfounded defense.

III.

THE ILLINOIS BRICK WALL OF STANDING
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The Sherman Act and The Clayton Act are centerpieces of antitrust law. Section 2 of the
Sherman Act makes it unlawful for any person to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce. 22
Section 4 of the Clayton Act addresses standing for plaintiffs in antitrust suits. It provides that any
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws may sue.23 A key aspect of both of these Acts is that they apply to any person. There
is no express qualification to this broad conference of standing in the Clayton Act. Illinois Brick,
however, interpreted Section 4 of the Clayton Act to provide standing only to direct purchasers.24
A: The Direct Purchaser Requirement
The Illinois Brick Court utilized Hanover Shoe to pave the way for rejecting the use of
pass-on theory offensively. Hanover Shoe involves parties at three levels of the distribution chain:
the alleged monopolist, the direct purchaser, and the indirect purchaser. United, the alleged
monopolist, leases shoe machinery.25 Hanover Shoe is the direct purchaser as it leased United’s
equipment.26 Hanover’s customers are the indirect purchasers as they do not buy or lease directly
from United. It phrased the Hanover Shoe decision as rejecting a defense that “indirect rather than
direct purchasers were the parties injured.”27 In essence, Hanover Shoe rejected an attempt by a
monopolist to use pass-on theory defensively to deprive the direct purchaser of standing by
showing that only the indirect purchaser suffered injury. The Illinois Brick inverted Hanover Shoe
rejecting pass-on offensively by an indirect purchaser to obtain standing against an alleged
monopolist and only providing standing to a direct purchaser.28
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15 U.S.C. §2.
15 U. S. C. §15(a).
24 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 724.
25 Hanover, 392 U.S. at 483.
26 Id.
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The petitioners in Illinois Brick manufacture and distribute concrete blocks to masonry
contractors.29 The masonry contractors submit bids to general contractors, who in turn submit bids
to customers such as the respondent.30 Therefore, there are two levels between the respondents
and the petitioners in this case. The Court applied a two-step test to conclude that the respondent
may not use pass-on offensively.31 First, the Court said that pass-on theory should be applied
consistently between plaintiffs and defendants.32 Thus, Hanover Shoe would have to be partially
overruled or limited if the Court were to allow it to be used offensively and not defensively.33
Second, the Court stated that the statutory interpretation of Section 4 in Hanover Shoe is that the
overcharged purchaser, and not others in the chain, is the party injured. 34 This would mean that
only the masonry contractors, the direct overcharged purchasers, have standing under Illinois
Brick.
The Court rejected the dissent’s allowance of the offensive use of pass-on theory for two
reasons.35 First, there is a risk of duplicative recoveries as the direct and indirect purchasers can
both recover.36 A duplicative recovery can result as the direct purchaser can recover the full
overcharge as well as the indirect purchaser(s). 37 The Court also refers to the possibility of
inconsistent adjudications as one purchaser can receive the full overcharge amount, and indirect
purchasers may still receive additional compensation.38 Second, the Court asserted that Hanover
Shoe’s reasoning cannot justify unequal treatment between plaintiffs and defendants seeking to
use pass-on theory.39 The Court maintains that the principal reason for this decision is based on
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the Court’s perception in Hanover Shoe of the difficulties associated with attempting complex
economic adjustments.40 For the Illinois Brick majority, the main basis of Hanover Shoe is the
difficulties associated with tracing the impacts of economic adjustments and the costs to the
judicial system of determining these factors. 41 Based on these two reasons, the Court concludes
that Hanover Shoe requires the prohibition of the use of pass-on theory offensively.42
B: Illinois Brick Lacks a Foundation
The majority misconstrues Hanover Shoe and introduces an artificial barrier to effective
antitrust enforcement. The two steps used by the majority to determine whether the decision is
consistent with Hanover Shoe are deeply flawed. The first step explained that Hanover Shoe’s
rejection of defensive pass-on theory by alleged monopolists would be “overruled” by allowing
pass-on theory to be used offensively by indirect purchasers against the alleged monopolist.43 The
Court stated that Hanover Shoe must be overruled for applying pass-on to plaintiffs because passon “must apply equally to plaintiffs and defendants.” 44 However, this requirement of equality
between plaintiffs and defendants is not found anywhere in Hanover Shoe. Hanover Shoe only
barred reliance on the use of the pass-on theory as a defensive mechanism.45 There is no mention
that plaintiffs may not use pass on offensively. Therefore, the Illinois Brick majority has imposed
an additional requirement without precedent in order to achieve a specified result. Hanover Shoe
would not be overruled in any way by allowing the use of pass-on theory offensively.
The second step stated that Hanover Shoe gives the construction to Section 4 that the
“overcharged direct purchaser, not others in the chain of distribution, is the party injured in his

40
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business or property.”46 This construction is unfounded, and such a limitation is contrary to the
decision. The Hanover Shoe decision supported providing standing to any injured party, citing
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, which provides that “any person who shall be injured” may recover
under antitrust laws.47 The Court also cited the general principle that “a victim of an overcharge
is damaged within the meaning of Section 4.”48 There was no reference to “direct purchaser” in
Hanover Shoe. Justice Brennan used statutory interpretation of Section 4 in his dissenting opinion.
His opinion focused on that language of Section 4 of the Clayton Act that provides comprehensive
coverage to all victims of the forbidden practices.49 Justice Brennan noted that if the Acts’ broad
language, providing standing to any person with an antitrust injury, means anything, then the
defendant incurs liability within the defendant’s chain of distribution. 50
Justice Brennan also correctly noted that the majority’s decision is a retreat from
precedent.51 Courts have concluded that an “ever present threat to deter anyone contemplating”
the violation of antitrust laws is the best way to fulfill the purposes of antitrust laws. 52 The
complexity of calculations cannot be conflated with the right to recovery. 53 The majority in Illinois
Brick discusses at length the complexity of economic adjustments to trace damages. 54 In a later
case, the Court characterized Illinois Brick as holding that the “splintered recoveries and litigative
burdens” imposed by apportionment between direct and indirect purchasers would undermine
antitrust laws.55 By doing so, it justifies the exclusion of potential plaintiffs based on the
complexity of damages. However, courts have been “cautioned not to add requirements to burden
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the private litigant beyond” what Congress specifies. 56 Hanover Shoe merely prevents certain
parties from using the pass-on defense to justify their illegal activities,57 whereas, Illinois Brick
imposes the added burden of limiting the parties that have standing to sue by barring the use of
pass-on theory offensively.
Illinois Brick also wrongly characterized the “principal basis” for Hanover Shoe.
According to the Illinois Brick majority, the principal basis for Hanover Shoe’s holding was the
difficulties associated with pricing economic decisions. 58 However, Hanover Shoe’s discussion of
the difficulty of predicting prices was mentioned simply to refute United’s argument that the passon defense is required by the law of economics. 59 The context for the discussion regarding pricing
economic decisions shows the real focus of the case was on effective antitrust enforcement and
providing a remedy to victims. The prior section of the decision discussed how the Court is
continuing to follow the principle that the victim of an overcharged has a claim.60 The subsequent
section referred to how the added calculations, imposed by the pass-on defense, could deter
plaintiffs resulting in the monopolist “retaining the fruits of their illegality.” 61 The Court’s
principal concern in Hanover Shoe was to provide a remedy those who suffered antitrust damages,
not to shrink potential standing as Illinois Brick does.
C. Economic Justifications for Illinois Brick
Some offer economic justifications for retaining Illinois Brick. One argument is that
overruling Illinois Brick would result in the price of products increasing to compensate the direct
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purchaser for relinquishing a full and exclusive antitrust claim.62 This argument is based on the
theory that indirect purchasers receive lower prices in anticipation of antitrust claims. 63 For
example, a retailer would discount a product’s price to the consumer by the estimated amount of
the overcharge weighted by the probability of the success of an antitrust suit.64 However, the
proponents of this argument acknowledge that some buyers are not actively considering possible
antitrust recoveries when making a pricing decision.65 There would also need to be perfect
market efficiency to ensure that indirect purchasers receive the exact amount of damages they
have incurred. Otherwise, the first goal of antitrust, to compensate victims of an antitrust
violation, would not be satisfied.
Some have posited that even if indirect purchasers had standing, they would not receive
significant compensation.66 The premise of this argument is that legal expenses would account
for much of the compensation.67 This argument prioritizes economic and procedural efficiency
at the expense of compensation for victims of antitrust violations. 68 Moreover, while legal
expenses may capture more of the recovery amount in many cases; it is not always the case.
There are situations where indirect purchasers bear most of or all of the monopolist’s overcharge.
In this case, the indirect purchaser could gain a substantial recovery amount even after legal
expenses. Consider Hanover Shoe, where the defendant argued that the direct purchaser should
not have standing because the direct purchaser charged all excess cost further down the chain of
distribution.69 This is a case where, if the allegations are true, the indirect purchasers are the
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Richard A. Posner & William M. Landes, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue under the Antitrust
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64 Id.
65 Id. at 607.
66 Hanover, 392 U.S. at 634.
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parties who suffered the greatest changes in position because of the monopolist. Yet under
Illinois Brick, only the direct purchaser may obtain judicial relief. Furthermore, the damages to
individual purchasers can aggregate to the point where indirect purchasers stand to gain a
substantial amount that is not consumed by legal expenses.
It is also argued that providing damages to indirect purchasers would reduce the overall
deterrence effect.70 Indeed, direct purchasers may not receive as much compensation when
indirect purchasers also have standing. However, there are many other considerations at play
that may encourage the direct purchaser to sue even with reduced compensation. For example,
market forces may bankrupt a direct purchaser that sustains higher supply costs due to a
monopolist. There is also a possible threat of entry by the monopolist by leveraging their lower
costs to wipe out the direct purchaser.

IV.

THE CURRENT VIEWPOINT OF THE COURT: APPLE INC. V. PEPPER

Regardless of the validity of Illinois Brick, Apple Inc. v. Pepper71 properly applies
precedent. The 5-4 decision has generated significant debate as to whether the decision is
inconsistent with Illinois Brick.72 This case arises out of “apps” sold on Apple’s App Store.73
Consumers contend that Apple monopolized the market for the sale of apps and utilized that
monopolistic power to charge consumers higher prices. 74 The main controversy arises when Apple
argues that the consumers are not direct purchasers under Illinois Brick and thus lack standing to
bring an antitrust suit.75
A: The Bright-Line Rule

70

Posner, supra at 614.
Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019).
72 Id. at 1526. (Gorsuch J Dissenting).
73 Id. at 1518.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 1519.
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Apple has imposed contractual and technological limitations to ensure that the App Store
is the only available market for iPhone users to purchase apps. 76 Most of the apps are created by
independent app developers, who pay thirty percent of the sales price to Apple for every sale.77
Apple charges consumers prices set by the developer and deducts thirty percent from the amount
remitted to the developer.78 The plaintiffs are consumers who allege that there would have been
pressure for Apple to lower its thirty percent commission in a competitive marketplace.79 They
also claim that the higher commission results in consumers paying more for iPhone apps than they
would pay in a competitive market.80
There is no dispute that the iPhone owners purchased the apps directly from Apple. 81 The
Court applies Illinois Brick to conclude that the owners have standing as they are direct
purchasers.82 For the majority, the plaintiff’s standing is a “straightforward conclusion.” 83 The
Court states that Illinois Brick’s bright-line rule only bars standing for alleged antitrust violators
two or more steps removed from the violator in the chain of distribution. 84 The Court does not
accept Apple’s suggestion that Illinois Brick allows consumers to sue only the party who sets the
retail price, regardless of whether that party sells the good or service directly to the complaining
party.85 Justice Kavanaugh, writing for the majority, points out that this would allow a
monopolistic retailer to avoid consumer antitrust suits by structuring their agreement to specify
that the manufacturer sets the retail price, and the retailer takes a commission on each sale. 86
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Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1519.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1519.
81 Id. at 1520.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1520.
85 Id. at 1521.
86 Id. at 1522.
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The majority also opens the door for both the app developers and the consumers to file
antitrust claims against Apple. The Court concluded that the suits are based on different theories
of harm.87 The consumers’ damages are based on the difference between the price paid and the
competitive price.88 The developers’ damages are based on their lost profits are a result of a
noncompetitive market.89 Therefore, unlike Illinois Brick, there would be no need to “trace the
effect of each overcharge through each step” of the distribution chain. 90
The dissent considers this issue in a different light by focusing on proximate cause. Justice
Gorsuch focused instead on who is paying the commission that Apple charges.91 The dissent
explained that “the right plaintiff to bring this suit is the one on whom the overcharge immediately
fell.”92 For Justice Gorsuch, the commission falls on the developers, and they are the only parties
with standing.93
Under this view, Illinois Brick would bar standing for the further downstream consumers. 94
For the dissent, Illinois Brick is “the other side of the coin” of Hanover Shoe by following
traditional rules of proximate causation only to allow the first affected consumers.95 The traditional
rules of proximate causation refer to the “general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at
least, is not to go beyond the first step.96
The dissent argues that the majority is simply using formalism. 97 Apple can amend its
contracts to change from collecting payments and deducting commissions when paying developers
to the reverse and specify that payments go directly to developers and developers then pay Apple
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a commission.98 The dissent also points out that while some amici suggest to the Court to overrule
Illinois Brick, the plaintiffs have not made such a request.99
B. The Decision is Consistent with Precedent
The dissent in Apple claims that the majority decision would permit the type of pass-on
actions prohibited under Illinois Brick.100 Justice Gorsuch continues that the majority is “recasting”
Illinois Brick.

In fact, the majority does not overrule Illinois Brick; it merely clarifies the

appropriate standard of applying the rule. Illinois Brick involved a distinguishable fact pattern. In
this case, the petitioners manufactured and distributed concrete blocks to masonry contractors.101
The masonry contractors, in turn, submitted bids to general contractors.102 The general contractors
submitted bids to the respondent.103 In contrast, there is no dispute that the iPhone owners
purchased the apps directly from Apple. 104 The majority concluded that resulted in a
“straightforward conclusion” to allow standing.105 It states that Illinois Brick provides the brightline rule that allows direct purchasers to sue but bars indirect purchasers from suing. 106 This brightline rule is the more accurate interpretation of Illinois Brick. Illinois Brick discusses at length how
the respondent is an indirect purchaser.107 The word “proximate cause” is found only once in the
entire case and is located in the dissent.108 As the majority correctly notes, this case does not
involve “multiple parties at different levels of a distribution chain” that are trying to recover “the
same passed-through overcharge initially levied by the manufacturer at the top of the chain” as in
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Illinois Brick.109 The Court’s concern in Illinois Brick related to “massive evidence and
complicated theories” of tracing damages. 110 The consumers here purchased directly from Apple,
and there is no need for the Court to attempt to trace the impacts of an initial overcharge. The
consumers also pay Apple directly instead of the app developers. Therefore, this case is consistent
with Illinois Brick’s holding.
Apple’s suggestion that Illinois Brick only provides standing against the party who sets the
price, regardless of whether the party is a direct or indirect seller, is baseless. Apple is arguing
that because developers set the price in this case and, therefore, consumers may not sue Apple.
The first issue with this argument is that Illinois Brick provides a bright-line rule where direct
purchasers may sue antitrust violators.111 Apple immediately disposes of the main holding of
Illinois Brick by stating that it is not relevant whether the party is a direct purchaser. Under Apple’s
argument, the indirect purchasers (consumers) would have to sue the developers that set the price,
despite the fact that they were direct purchasers of Apple. The second issue is that Apple’s
approach would provide a recipe for monopolists to structure agreements in a manner that would
evade antitrust scrutiny.

Justice Kavanaugh points to the traditional supplier-retailer

relationship.112 Typically, retailers purchase goods from suppliers and then sell the goods at a
markup to consumers. For example, Company B purchases masks from Company A at $10, and
Company B sells to consumers for $14. Under an evasive structure, the suppliers would determine
the price. Suppose Company B wants to avoid antitrust scrutiny. Company A would list the selling
price at $14 and charge Company B $10. In this case, Company B would give only $10 to
Company A to keep the $4 markup. In this second case, Company B would be able to avoid
antitrust suits by consumers since Company A technically set the retail price. Justice Kavanaugh

109
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declines to “green-light monopolistic retailers to exploit their market position in that way. We
refuse to rubber-stamp such a blatant evasion of the statutory text and judicial precedent.”113
The dissenting opinion would allow only developers to bring an antitrust suit in this case.
However, developers are not likely to bring an antitrust suit against Apple. Developers face being
removed from the App Store completely for challenging Apple. 114 Apple’s developer license
agreement provides that “Apple reserves the right to cease marketing, offering, and allowing
download at any time, with or without cause, by providing notice of termination to You (the
developer).”115 This sort of retribution would deprive many apps of their access to consumers
without any other means of reaching iPhone users.
Apple’s argument against standing for respondents’ claims that evaluating their causes of
action would require “performing thousands of different functions, with countless different
potential substitutes” is not compelling.116 Apple claims that calculating the demand and supply
elasticities would require computation “on a scale never before imagined, let alone undertaken.” 117
Apple has previously undertaken complex damages calculations in the “eBooks” case where Apple
violated the Sherman Act by conspiring with publishers to fix book prices. 118 In that case, the
damages calculation against Apple would have required the assessment of 150 million e-book
purchasers of 1.3 million book titles.119 The case subsequently settled for more than $560
million.120 If anything, the complexity of the damages calculation, in this case, will encourage
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settlement and the implementation of more competitive practices for the iPhone app market. In
any case, complexity alone should not preclude effective antitrust enforcement.
C. Developer Discontent and Changes Post Apple v. Pepper
The growing discontent of app developers with Apple’s commission is well documented. 121
The thirty percent app store fee does not apply to Apple’s own Apple Music but does apply to
competitors such as Spotify.122 Some apps, such as Uber that Apple does not compete with do not
have to pay the thirty percent fee.123 Some app developers would be hesitant to challenge Apple
because they benefit from the “99-cent” rule.124 Apple requires that apps be priced at rates ending
in 99 cents. The developers will have to almost double the price if they want to increase the price
beyond 99 cents to $1.99. The 99-cent rule decreases pricing competitiveness on the App Store
by greatly reducing the options.
Apple has recently partially responded to some of the criticisms regarding its commissions .
The company has launched a “Small Business Program” that would reduce the thrity percent
commission to fifteen percent for businesses earning up to $1 million per year.125 Perhaps the
increased anti-trust scrutiny is responsible for these changes. However, this does not address the
complaints of larger companies such as Spotify, who would still only receive seventy percent of
the price of their in-app purchases. The harm to consumers of the lack of a competitive app
landscape still exists for apps sold by developers that do not qualify as “small businesses.” An
argument can also be made that fifteen percent is not competitive as Apple still maintains its App
Store as the only place where iPhone users can purchase Apps.

V.

ISSUES WITH THE BRIGHT-LINE RULE AND THE PATH FORWARD
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The Court in Apple did not need to address the implications of platforms as the consumers
satisfied the standing requirements under the bright-line rule. However, platforms pose unique
challenges as they engage with many different parties and are hubs of commerce. When standing
is not as straightforward as in Apple, the bright-line rule shows its limitations.
A. Why the Bright-Line Approach Does Not Work for Platforms
Apple’s App Store is not unique in posing a challenge in defining who qualifies as the direct
purchaser. Consider the case of a food delivery company such as DoorDash or UberEats.
Consumers open the app and select a restaurant to place an order. The order is forwarded to the
restaurant, and the app finds a nearby driver to deliver the order. The app then accepts the
consumer’s payment and splits the amount between the driver, restaurants, and app developers.
It is more difficult to discern who the consumer directly purchases from in this case.
Momentarily putting the restaurant aside, are the drivers considered employees of Uber or
DoorDash? If the drivers are just employees of the delivery companies, the case that consumers
are direct purchasers from the delivery companies grows stronger. However, these companies
treat drivers as independent contractors and not as employees.126 If the court accepts this
relationship, then consumers cannot sue the delivery companies. They would only have standing
against each individual “independent contractor” driver. Returning to the restaurants, the
delivery companies can argue that they provide a service to restaurants to allow them to accept
delivery orders. Under this argument, consumers would be direct purchasers and have standing
against each independent restaurant and not against the delivery company.
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The issue with Apple’s bright-line rule is that it also provides a bright-line approach to
evade antitrust scrutiny. Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Apple pointed out that this bright-line
approach values “form over substance.”127 Courts have rejected “artificial distinctions” that do
not serve to further the goals of antitrust laws. 128 Currently, Apple collects payments from
consumers for apps purchased and disburses only the purchase price minus the app store
commission to developers. This methodology provides clarity that consumers are the direct
purchasers from Apple. The directness of the purchase directly from Apple contributed to the
ease with which the majority concluded that consumers had standing as direct purchasers. 129 It is
worth considering how the outcome would be different if Apple instead contractually specified
that the payments from consumers will be provided directly to the developers, and then Apple
will deduct their commission. Under this approach, it would seem under the bright-line approach
that consumers are the direct purchasers from the developer. This modification would deprive
consumers of standing against Apple under the bright-line approach. Therefore, while the
bright-line approach may be easy to apply, it is also easy to avoid. The purpose of this brightline rule is to simplify administration to improve antitrust enforcement. 130 However, antitrust
enforcement is not improved when enforcement is easy to evade. Utilizing the food delivery app
example, Uber could modify its contractual terms to avoid antitrust liability. For example, it
could specify that consumer payments flow directly to the restaurants or drivers that are
independent contractors. Under the bright-line approach, consumers would be considered direct
purchasers of the restaurants and drivers, and not Uber.
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Uber does not further the goals of antitrust if it changed its contractual language to avoid
liability from consumers. For example, Uber has developed tools that would sabotage
competitors by sending malicious ride-sharing requests.131 Uber could use the weakened
competition to raise fees on consumers. Also, Uber has been personalizing prices based on what
it thinks that a consumer will pay.132 A consumer would not have standing to argue that Uber’s
anticompetitive practices resulted in fewer alternatives and higher prices. In this case, only
restaurants or drivers would have standing. However, many drivers depend on Uber as their
source of income and would not be willing to sue the company. There is also the fact that drivers
may believe that less competition for Uber will give them more deliveries and increase their
earnings. Restaurants would also be reluctant to sue a company providing them with additional
revenue and risk getting removed. The vast number of drivers and restaurants further lowers the
likelihood of antitrust suits as the amount received by each may not amount to a significant sum
after legal expenses. This example demonstrates that depriving a party with an injury of standing
for ostensibly efficiency reasons does not always lead to effective antitrust enforcement.
B. How Courts Should Address Antitrust Standing for Platforms
The most effective proposal begins with understanding how platforms leverage their unique
market function to gain benefits. Amazon alters its search algorithm during negotiations with
sellers to show them how much power it maintains over their sales. 133 Apple rejected Spotify’s
app updates based on conditions not imposed on its own Apple Music app. 134 Amazon controls
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almost 50% of the US e-commerce market share.135 Apple’s App Store accounts for 64% of the
app revenue as compared with Google’s Play Store. 136 Given the sheer dominance of these
platforms in their market spaces, sellers and consumers have few options other than to abide by
the terms set by the platforms. These platforms leverage their market power to undermine
competition and favor their own products.137
A functional antitrust principle for standing recognizes that platforms function by bringing
together many different parties. Amazon brings together sellers, buyers, logistics companies, and
advertisers, to name a few. The best pass-on proposal involves providing standing to any injured
party. In the App Store scenario, consumers would not face the pressure of their entire revenue at
stake and would be more likely to bring an antitrust suit. This approach would effectively overrule
Illinois Brick and hence Apple. The Apple court did not have to bar the consumers because it was
undisputed that they were direct purchasers. However, as the dissent points out, Apple can easily
alter its terms under the current approach to avoid liability. Providing standing for all injured
parties is based on statutory text, precedent to further antitrust goals.
The Statutory text strongly supports providing standing to all impacted parties. Section 4 of
the Clayton Act provides that any person who is injured may sue.138 The Senate Report for the
Clayton Act includes findings that consumers bear most of the economic burden of antitrust
violations in the form of higher prices. 139 The report demonstrates that the Clayton Act was
intended to provide a remedy regardless of whether or not the consumers purchased directly from
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the violator.

“Section 4C is intended to assure that consumers are not precluded from the

opportunity of proving the amount of their damage and to avoid problems with respect to
manageability [of class actions], standing, privity, target area, remoteness, and the like.”140 Case
law also demonstrates that Section 4 is intended to protect “all who are made victims of the
forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated.”141 Such a broad sweep of potential
plaintiffs by Section 4 demonstrates that Congress intended to provide a remedy to all injured
parties. Justice Brennan’s dissent in Illinois Brick points out that the majority is undermining
Congress’s purpose for the Clayton Act by imposing limitations on parties that may have
standing.142 Providing standing to all impacted parties recognizes just how broadly platforms
reach. It also alleviates situations where the direct purchaser may not sue because of the degree of
control the platform maintains over its revenues.
States have taken the lead and authorized indirect purchasers to sue under state antitrust laws.
143

These cases have often proceeded in at least two courts. 144 Therefore, there is potential for

double recovery as indirect purchasers have a claim under state law and direct purchasers under
federal law.145 The Antitrust Modernization Commission (AMC) report has suggested overruling
Illinois Brick to allow indirect purchasers to have standing. 146 The AMC is concerned with the
burdens imposed by having “duplicative” federal direct purchaser litigation and state indirect
purchaser litigation.147 The current situation “imposes undue burdens on the judicial system and
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the parties, wastes resources, increases the risk of duplicative recoveries, skews the parties’
incentives to settle, and hinders efficient global settlements.” 148 There is also a federalism
component of this issue as more than thirty-five states allow the indirect purchaser to have
standing.149 A unified federal approach that allows standing to indirect purchasers would ensure
more consistent litigation and more effective antitrust enforcement.
Providing standing to all injured parties furthers the twin objectives traditionally recognized
for private antitrust enforcement: compensation of the victims of antitrust violation and to deter
future violations.150 Here, allowing any injured party to sue furthers the objective to compensate
victims of an antitrust violation. In contrast, limiting standing to direct purchasers would not
compensate other parties. The deterrence objective would be greatly enhanced by allowing
standing. Platforms commonly engage in coercive practices to shape the market. As demonstrated
above, platforms have a great degree of control over the revenues of their customers. Allowing
only direct purchasers to sue would allow platforms to use a big stick to threaten revenues of direct
purchasers. In contrast, many indirect purchasers are, by definition, not as closely related to the
alleged monopolist. This greater degree of separation could make them more willing to bring an
antitrust suit against the monopolist. The greater threat of an antitrust suit would make platforms
more vigilant of their potential violations and resulting liabilities.
C. Criticisms of Full Standing
The first concern with providing standing to indirect purchasers is that it can complicate
damages calculations. Illinois Brick referred to the apportionment difficulties that would result
from allowing an indirect purchaser to sue.151 Damages calculations are complex in any antitrust
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case. The Court emphasized the amount of evidence and the complexity of economic theories to
calculate indirect damages.152 Antitrust cases frequently do involve calculations that are difficult
to determine and require expert testimony.153 In Apple, the Court notes, however, that complicated
damages calculations should not allow monopolists to avoid liability. 154 Platforms bring together
many parties and serve critical functions in commerce, making any damages calculations more
complex. Limiting standing to direct purchasers based on complexity of damages would
effectively allow monopolist platforms to avoid liability for the many other parties that they serve.
The tradeoff for greater judicial efficiency at the expense of compensation for antitrust victims is
too costly to justify.
The second concern with providing standing to all parties is the danger of multiple
recoveries.155 However, the nature of antitrust suits makes multiple liability a remote possibility.156
Antitrust actions involve years of discovery and have a short statute of limitations, which
discourages later suits.157 The statute of limitations for antitrust suits is only four years.158 A
number of procedural tools also exist to mitigate the defendant’s burdens, such as statutory
interpleader, the doctrines res judicata and collateral estoppel, and compulsory joinder. 159 As
Justice Brennan wrote in his dissent for Illinois Brick, “the day is long past when courts,
particularly federal courts, will deny relief to a deserving plaintiff merely because of procedural
difficulties or problems of apportioning damages.”160

VI.

CONCLUSION

152

Id.
Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. at 1514.
154 Id.
155 Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. at 1524.
156 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 763.
157 Id. at 764.
158 15 U.S.C. § 15b.
159 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 762.
160 Id.
153

24

Illinois Brick is even more out of place today than it was on the date of the decision. The
calls for greater antitrust scrutiny have accompanied the rise of technology giants. So many
businesses and consumers depend upon technology platforms daily. The degree of control these
platforms possess requires an effective antitrust safeguard . The rigid approaches favoring bright
lines underappreciate how platforms function and how far they reach. Difficult damages
calculations should not leave businesses and consumers without remedy. Our antitrust laws
envision providing a remedy to all parties injured as a result of monopolistic activity.
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